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Abstract
Today’s businesses environment is forcing companies to become increasingly more efficient
in applying Internet technology to conduct transactions. AS the possibility of infection by
computer virus is much greater now than ever before, businesses search for appropriate
corporate antivirus software to safeguard their computer systems. This paper considers
corporate antivirus software switching as one of the major security selection problem and
proposes possible avenues for software switching decision and management.
In conceptual model, we draw upon switching costs where transaction costs, learning costs,
and artificial costs were examined as main costs for software switching decision. Our
findings shown only two out of three types of switching costs have influence over corporate
antivirus software switching decisions. Despite the existence of switching costs, businesses
continue to repeat software switching because the perceived risks of security threats are
much greater than the switching cost itself. Furthermore, we examine various approaches to
the cost of switching and then propose an index map to evaluate switching decision. Five sets
of propositions are advanced to help guide this research.
Keywords: Corporate antivirus software (CAV), Information security, Switching costs,
Service switching
Introduction
Constructing an e-commerce business environment using information technology (IT) has
become a growing trend in corporation governance. More and more businesses are using the
Internet and computer systems as the basis to develop their business application, e.g.
Electronic Banking and Virtual Personal Network service (VPN). However, the Internet is an
open cyber environment. These applications are typically exposed to security threats such as
computer virus, worms, and Trojans. These security threats cause damages to the computer
systems and put the systems’ privacy in jeopardy.
Computer viruses have become an ongoing world problem and can travel quickly through the
Internet, causing even more destruction. According to a survey from Computer Security
Institute, businesses financial losses due to security breaches have escalated to $140 million
dollars in 2004; of which the biggest losses was caused by computer viruses (Gordon et al.
2005). More recently, a survey by the Department of Trade and Industry in the United
Kingdom found that 88 percent of businesses had been affected by computer viruses in 2005
(Potter 2006). In the next five years, viruses in hybrid and advanced forms are expected to
continue to have a large-scale impact on all kinds of businesses, such that protecting
businesses against viruses attack will be harder than ever (Robbins 2004).
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In the fight against these viruses, the best solution is to utilize appropriate corporate antivirus
software (CAV). The software providers offer numerous CAV to meet businesses’ security
needs, ranging from simple virus protection program to more sophisticated and complex
antivirus program. Although the instillation rate is near to 100 percent, there is no software
that guarantees full protection against all virus threats (Keller 2005). For added protections,
businesses tried to install two antivirus packages on one PC. Nevertheless, it is infeasible to
do so because of two different antivirus packages disrupt each other's functions (Kaspersky
2005); thus, if a business finds its current CAV short in meeting its requirements, it can
switch to a new CAV provider. When businesses activate the mechanism of switching CAV,
it considers the switching costs as vital factors.
Earlier works demonstrated that the switching costs were significantly related to software
switching decision. Businesses were often locked into specialized software, which caused
difficulty in finding a replacement (Laudon 2000; O’Brian 2004). It is interesting that
scholars noted that the most businesses emphasized the features and effectiveness provided
by antivirus software, rather than the cost factor (Hubbard 1998; Liu 2003). This argument
shows that, in practice, the reasons for switching security software are different from the
reasons for switching other application software. There seems to an understanding that
security software is fundamentally unlike from other application software used by businesses.
Additionally, the IDC annual report found that the market share of antivirus providers
changed every year, suggesting that businesses switched CAV under some conditions that we
currently do not know (Burke et al. 2004). Since serious lack of study reported in this issue,
the goal of this paper is to provide an understanding of the why businesses switching CAV
and how do switching costs affect the CAV switching decision.
To better understand this issue, this paper development a conceptual model grounded in
Klemperer’s switching costs view in conjunction with transaction cost theory and examined
this model on a deeply multi-cases data. The contribution of this paper has three folds. First,
we seek to fill this gap of studies in the topic of switching cost related to security software, in
particular the CAV switching. Second, we provide guidelines that businesses can follow
when making decisions about switching CAV. Finally, we proposed an index map for IT
executives to ensure switching options. In addition, researchers can base the questionnaire of
index map to develop future studies in quantitative method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 contains observations on the state of
antivirus industry and a concise literature review on switching costs. Section 3 proposes a
conceptual model of CAV switching, and describes the methodology uses in this research.
Section 4 describes the profiles of the cases, and Section 5 assesses the results of the study
and lists the research propositions. Finally, proposed an index map for practitioners to assess
switching among CAV, more, implications for researchers and practitioners are drawn.
General background
Setting: The Antivirus Software Industry
The development of the antivirus software industry has begun in the early 1990s. Antivirus
providers can be divided into three groups based on their market share. They are: industrial
leaders, second-tier providers, and others that have no significant impact in this market.
Table 1 shows the leaders and one company of the second-tier providers (Kaspersky 2005).
Among the leaders, Symantec, McAfee, and Trend Micro, severely engage in marketing and
after-sales activities that significantly affect the market. Second-tier companies are providers
whose market share is substantially lower than those of the three leaders, even though their
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annual income amounts to tens of millions of dollars. The majority of such providres has a
significant presence in their respective domestic markets, but a relatively small presence in
foreign markets. Sophos, the most successful antivirus provider in the UK, is an example of
a second-tier providers. Finally, the “other” providers category includes several dozen
companies, most of which only engage in their respective domestic markets. In 2004, the
total market for antivirus solutions was worth $3.7 billion, compared to $2.7 billion in 2003
(Burke et al. 2004).
Table 1: Income and Market Share of CAV Providers
Annual income Market share
Company 2003 2004 2003 2004
Industry leaders
Symantec 1098 1698 28.3% 35%
McAfee 577 683 22.6% 14%
Trend Micro 382 587 12.4% 11%
Second-tier companies
Sophos (UK) 97 156 2.1% 3%
The State of the Antivirus Software Industry
Businesses usually choose antivirus software because of their technological characteristics.
The most important consideration is a comprehensive virus protection offered by the CAV
(Liu 2003). There is relatively few software in the market that offer 100% protection. In fact,
the majority of antivirus software guarantees less than 90% protection; hence, insufficient
protection is the most important problem faced by both users and the antivirus industry.
Kaspersky (2005) found several issues related to insufficient protection. First, some antivirus
providers are unable to update their ’antivirus signature’ immediately after a new virus is
detected so that computer systems are defenseless against attack. Second, some software can
not detect certain viruses when they attack computers, which imply that the software are
inferior and can have a strong negative impact on business. Third, some software is more
hardware resource required, thus caused the computer system in a poor performance when
install a specific antivirus software. Finally, it is currently infeasible to install two different
antivirus packages on the same computer to increased protection due to compatibility issues.
The characteristic of CAV differs from other application software, and these differences have
distinct implications for customer satisfaction and intention to switch CAV service. First,
CAV need regular signature up-to-date for comprehensive protection. Running antivirus
software without the latest updates exposes computer systems very rapidly to attack by the
latest threats. Second, the service is constrained by the term of contract validity. Antivirus
service requires annual renewal with original service provider for the newest signature update
service. Third, CAV comprises two components: the antivirus servers and the clients. CAV
has to install on antivirus servers first (may not only one but at least two servers for disaster
recovery), then deploy to all clients inside a business by local area network. Thus, IT staffs
have to learn the operational skill about installation, configuration the antivirus servers and
deployment CAV in all clients within business. Finally, it is impossible to install two distinct
antivirus packages in same PC to increase protection due to they distribute each function and
cause computer system unstable. Therefore, if a business finds its current CAV have been
unable to stem the increase virus attacks on computer systems, it can switch to a new CAV
provider.
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Switching Costs and Service Switching
Switching costs refer to the costs of switching from one product to another competing
product (Porter 2001). Giving the results of O’Brian (2006) study in office automation,
switching from the Microsoft Office suite to the competing StarOffice suite, which may cost
less in software itself but imposed a higher switching costs on users, who were accustomed to
the functions and file formats of Microsoft Office. In another word, the higher the switching
costs, the more difficult it is to switch brands even though with low adoption costs; hence,
switching costs is viewed as a vital strategic element in the marketing arena. It has been
suggested that switching costs will affect prices, market share and also linked to a variety of
competitive phenomena, such as pricing wars and large discounts offered by businesses to
attract new customer (Klemperer 1987, 1995; Chen and Hitt 2002; Fornell 1992).
Reasons to switching include the economic, functional, and emotional sacrifices that may be
necessary before, during, and after service conversion. Klemperer (1987) divided switching
costs into three categories: transaction costs, learning costs, and artificial costs. In awareness
of transaction cost’s definition, we must further explore transaction cost theory to investigate
the origin of such cost. Transaction costs are incurred when customers switch suppliers,
because finding new suppliers involves the processes of searching for and evaluating
alternative products. If a business decides to switch current software, the firm has to search
for a new supplier and evaluate the supplier’s reputation. The process of finding and
evaluating a new supplier generates extra tangible and intangible expenses, which called
transaction costs. Williamson (1985) extended Coase’s (1937) concept and defined four
important attributes of transaction costs, namely, “bounded rationality”, “opportunism”,
“uncertainty,” and ‘”asset specificity”. Bounded rationality is that economic actors try to be
rational, but they are limited. On the other hand, economic actors are inability of human mind
to find or process all the information about a transaction; therefore, it is conducted with a
certain level of uncertainty. Opportunism refers to the economic actors’ tendency to be
motivated by self-interest, which makes allowances for guile. Because of these two underline
assumptions, there is uncertainty about transaction’s future, including ex ante and ex post
uncertainty. Finally and important one, Williamson defined asset specificity as: “The degree
to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without
sacrifice of productive value”, thus, when a transaction requires highly specific investments
(asset specificity), there must be a mechanism to protect the investor. This paper defined
assets specificity in CAV switching as physical IT hardware and system software request.
Learning costs relate to the effort customers must expend to reach the same level of comfort
with a new product that they had with their previous product; for instance, when a business
switches to an ERP application from SAP to Oracle. Users must learn about these new
functions and operating skills since the functions of Oracle’s system are different to those of
the SAP system, which can be seen as learning costs. Finally, artificial costs are the costs
related to what the business does to retain its existing customers – for example, frequent flyer
miles provided by airlines (Klemperer 1987, 1995).
Much effort has been conducted to study the effect of customer satisfaction in on-line service
switching. Consumer satisfaction will influence service continuation or service switching
(Kim et al. 2006). The selection of antivirus and content filtering software has been measured
in six criteria including: installation, operation, administration, notification, antivirus, and
content filtering (Mamaghani 2002). Except for content filtering, the other five criteria are
used in evaluating the satisfaction of CAV service, and to identify the reasons why business
switches their CAV service.
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The Conceptual model and methodology
The Conceptual Model
Consistent with our research purpose of studying the switching CAV, we have followed a
detailed and precise theoretical and conceptual model illustrate in figure 1. We specify the
intention to switching CAV as the dependent variable. From economic perspective, that
views switching behavior primarily in terms of motivation to switch CAV service, and the
switching decisions are made by evaluating three types of switching costs. We identify
motivations to switch CAV service as an independent variable. Transaction cost, learning
cost, and artificial cost were the three modulators that influence the intention to switching
CAV service. These three modulators were adapted from Klemperer’s switching costs, which
is widely applied to analyze IS/IT switching phenomena (Chen and Hitt 2002; Kim 2003).
Figure 1: Conceptual model
After the completion of the CAV switching decision process, a business faces two choices:
switching to new antivirus provider, or keeping working with the existing one. The switching
activity is defined as “successful” for the condition that a business decides to switch to a new
provider. Oppositely, if a business continues to work with current provider, the switching
activity is defined as “fail”.
Methodology
Delving into CAV switching literature, there has been no related works and might be
considered as a new topic in research of information security. For such reason, more
exploratory studies are needed before a theory can be formed. The Case study approach was
selected for this research as this approach lends itself to concentrated focus on the issue, and
accommodates several data-gathering techniques. A survey of business users on this topic
would not be appropriate because the terminology and some of the concepts are still being
formulated. Besides, business users are less likely to divulge highly sensitive data about
information security in a survey and send it to a stranger (Kotulic et al. 2004). Therefore, we
adopt a preliminary research method, case study, most appropriate for exploratory and
explanatory research since they are able to capture a depth of details on the subjects.
Researches used case study approach as their research strategy in the Information System
discipline (Hsieh 2002; Kern 2002; Khalfan 2004). The case study approach refers to an in-
depth study or investigation of an existing phenomenon using multiple sources of evidence
within its real-life context (Yin 1994). The research approach can be used for a single case
based on thorough observation of a case and in depth details about the subject, or for multiple
cases with multiple-factor findings and a cross-analysis that can result in the development of
a theoretical framework (Eisenhardt 1989). This paper used the case study methodology with
multiple cases and develops a set of propositions based on these cases’ findings.
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Of the four organizations, one academic institution and three businesses were selected as case
studies for this research. The network administrators, chief information security officer
(CISO), and security staffs of these businesses were the key personnel interviewed. Construct
validity was established by triangulation, chain of evidence and formal review by the
interviewees for verification (Yin 1994). This paper gathered data via notes, documents, and
one-on-one interviews. The interviews were conducted semi-formally, with one researcher
talking to one representative of the case businesses. Each interview included questionnaire
was as follows: Profile of the case, the business’s antivirus budget, the reasons for switching
CAV, as well as the switching costs involved in and influence on the switching decision-
making process. Five possible responses were provided (strongly agree, agree, natural
disagree, strongly disagree). In the next section, the background of the four businesses will be
described and the results of the decisions they made in CAV switching will be thoroughly
reported.
Cases Profiles
Several criteria were settled to select for appropriate cases: the size of the organization; its
experience of CAV switching; and the industry of the organization. In terms of size, the size
of these four cases range from small-sized organizations, which employ 300 to 500 people; to
medium-size organization, which employ over 1000 people. The size of organization
implicates the information capability; that is, the large an organization, the more critical its
information security issue. Therefore, a medium-size organization tends to pay more attention
on the information security issue than a small-size organization.
Of the four cases that we contacted, each one had its experience in the activity of switching
CAV. In order to apply our findings to a broader condition, the cases were drawn from
distinct industry sectors: academia, telecommunication, and manufactures. The data was
gathered between July and November 2005, with follow-up interviews in the early 2006. We
will briefly describe the four cases and cases’ details in Table 2.
Table 2: Detail of Cases
Case A
M University
Case B
V Telecom
Case C
F Electric
Case D
S Tech
Industry sector Academia Service Manufacture Manufacture
Number of clients 1100 750 300 200
Original use CAV Symantec Symantec Trend Micro Trend Micro
Switching to CAV Trend Micro McAfee Symantec Symantec
Switching results Failed successful Successful Failed
Case A: M University
M University is a prestigious University in Taiwan. As the end of 2005 equipped with
1,100 networked PCs. M University had evaluated to switch to Trend Micro but the activity
failed. Therefore, it will be used as a failed switching case.
Case B: V Telecom
V Telecom is one of the three leading telecommunication companies in Taiwan, which
provides 3G communication services. It employed over 750 employees. It has successfully
switched its CAV from Symantec to McAfee in 2003. This case is used as an example for a
successful switching experience.
Case C: F Electric
F Electric was the leading heavy electrical engineering equipment in Taiwan. Its main
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products are high-voltage transformers, and it is a certified supplier of General Electric in the
US. The company switched CAV from Trend Micro to Symantec successfully once in 2004,
and thus used as the second successful example in this research.
Case D: S Tech
S Tech is a manufacturer of IT equipment accessories. It supplies world famous brands,
such as Fuji and Sony, with cases for consumer electronic products. To deal with ‘Blaster’
virus outbreak, S Tech switched to Symantec CAV temporarily and removed it soon after the
crisis had passed. We use S Tech as another failed switched case.
Discussion
Switching Reasons
In regard to the switching reasons, we found ‘sustained dissatisfaction’ as the main reason
that motivates businesses to switch CAV. Four Cases’ switching details show in Table 3. M
University intents to switch CAV that resulted in a series of continuous attack by worm-type
viruses, e.g. “Nimda”, “CodeRed” and ”Blaster”. As Symantec did not provide adequate
protection, every virus breaches has make great impact on the business which normally lasted
for about a week and thus resulted in an enormous operating losses. Hence, the business was
then motivated to switch to new CAV to obtain adequate protection.
Table 3: Reasons of switching
Reason of Switching Description
M University Dissatisfaction Unable to stop virus attacks
V Telecom Incompatibility With new e-Mail system
F Electric Dissatisfaction Hard to administrating clients
S Tech Dissatisfaction Unable to stop virus attacks
In contrast, V Telecom switched their CAV due to incompatible with their new e-mail
system, MS Exchange 2003, which provided higher security level of e-mail service. As
McAfee’s CAV was the only package that supported the function of content filtering of the
new e-mail system, V Telecom had no choice but to switch to McAfee for their security
needs.
To summarize, we found that businesses switch their CAV due to ‘sustained dissatisfaction’.
The sustained dissatisfaction was caused by continuous virus breaches. If a CAV cannot
protect a business from computer viruses attacks, its daily operations could be affected, and
the business would be encourage to switch CAV. Hence, we propose the following
proposition regarding the businesses’ intention to switch their CAV.
Proposition1. The greater degree of business dissatisfying with current CAV performance,
the higher frequency they switching to a new provider’s CAV for effective protections.
Transaction Costs of Switching
Effect of bounded rationality
In this research, ‘bounded rationality’ was determined as how many CAV packages a
business evaluates before it switching to a new provider. For instance, if a business evaluates
all CAV in industrial leaders before making a decision to switch from Symantec to McAfee;
then we say its decision was not limited by bounded rationality. On the contrary, if a business
evaluates only Trend Micro before making any decision, its decision has been limited by
bounded rationality.
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M University originally implemented Symantec as its CAV. When the Chief Information
Security Officer (CISO) motivated to switching CAV, it evaluated only Trend Micro, a
competitor of Symantec, rather than considered all providers in the industry leaders.
Consequently, it is limited by bounded rationality.
V Telecom was the only business that evaluated all CAV before making a switching decision.
In late 2003, V Telecom implemented MS Exchange 2003 as new e-mail system, but the
Symantec CAV used at the time did not support content filtering on MS Exchange 2003. It
means that the Symantec was incompatible with the new e-mail system. Therefore, V
Telecom had to search another CAV to fit into the MS Exchange 2003. It surveyed all other
providers in the industrial leaders- including Trend Micro and McAfee- before making a
decision to switch from Symantec to McAfee. Hence, V Telecom was not limited by bounded
rationality.
F Electric switched from Trend Micro to Symantec, because they were not motivated to
evaluate another CAV. They selected Symantec because it was the leader in antivirus
industry. This decision was based on the product’s market share and the provider’s
reputation. Thus, ‘no motivation’ to evaluate other CAV was the main driver of Case C’s
decision, which was also limited by bounded rationality.
S Tech switched CAV because of the ‘Blaster’ virus outbreak erupted during 2003, which
impact on its daily operations. Hence, the CAV switching decision had to be made within a
short time in order to recover from the virus outbreak. To address the problem, the CISO
decided to deploy Symantec’s CAV on all clients, but switched back to the previous CAV
when the crisis had passed. Because it did not evaluate all CAV in the industry leaders when
making the switching decision, S Tech was limited by bounded rationality.
Effect of Opportunism
Opportunism is more than the simple defense of one’s interest or value maximization; it is
self interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1985). Thus, in this paper, opportunism refers to
a provider’s intention to promote CAV to customers regardless of their software fitting with
customer or not. We found that opportunism was evident in the two cases where CAV were
purchased from authority resellers (contacted with providers), but the other businesses
procured CAV from their long-term IT resellers, and implemented the software by
themselves. Our findings indicated that opportunism did not have any effect on a business
decision-making process when the reseller could not contact their customer directly and
support the opportunism is one behavior assumptions of transaction cost theory.
The reseller of Trend Micro promoted the CAV to M University aggressively and tried to
finalize the deal as soon as trial CAV was installed. However, M University’s CISO
concerned the reseller’s IT staffs could not implement the software properly due to lack of
experience, but the reseller debated that the CAV was easy to install, no matter how large the
business. This assurance of the sales team implied that Trend Micro tries to sell its CAV to a
customer regardless customer’s needs and thus opportunism existed in M University.
In V Telecom, the sales teams from Trend Micro and Symantec tried to sell their CAV by
promising to solve any problem after deal, even though both sales teams had known that their
packages were not fully compatible with the MS Exchange 2003. The promises implied the
sales teams tried to promote CAV regardless customer needs. This promise was a sign of an
opportunistic behavior and V Telecom was another case to prove that opportunism occurred
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in the contacted with providers.
By contrast, the switching decisions of F Electric and S Tech were not affected by provider’s
opportunistic behavior due to they did not get in touch with the providers. Thus, the
providers’ sales teams could not deal the businesses to promote their products directly. F
Electric and S Tech decided to switch CAV based on provider’s good reputations; purchased
software from their long-term IT suppliers, and deployed the software by IT staffs.
Effect of Uncertainty
Adopting CAV in a business is like outsourcing an information security service to a provider
for protecting its in-house IS. Accordingly, we can use the software outsourcing perspectives
to examine the uncertainty in CAV switching decision. Uncertainty about software
outsourcing is caused by unclear specifications, scheduling delivery dates, and budgetary
problems (Wang 2002).
When evaluation the CAV switching, the M University’s CISO emphasized on the reseller’s
ability to deploy the CAV in a large network environment because of its complex network
infrastructure, which consisted of Ethernet, Giga Ethernet and wireless. However, the CISO
took two months to evaluate two resellers authorized by Trend Micro. He found neither of the
two resellers had experience in deploying CAV in larger and complex network
infrastructures, and only realized that it was impossible to find any qualified reseller. For this
reason, the CISO decided that is too risky to make a switching decision because this
transaction implies high uncertainty then decided to call off the switching activity. Due to
lack of qualified reseller before the procurement deadline, he decided to remain with the
existing reseller who had experience in implementing Symantec CAV in large network
environment.
The others cases perceived low uncertainty when switching CAV. In V Telecom, because of
the provider’s reputation and consultant’s experience for the new e-mail system, lower the
uncertainty. The provider, McAfee, enjoyed a good reputation in the antivirus industry and
was recommended by the consultant as being the only solution fitting with MS Exchange
2003. Moreover, V Telecom pre-tested the McAfee CAV before implementation to iron out
any problem in order to reduce the uncertainty involve in the CAV switching.
Effect of asset specificity
The CAV composed of two components: the antivirus servers and the clients. Software has to
install on antivirus server then deployment to all clients by local area network. This study
defined assets specificity in CAV switching as physical IT hardware and system software
requirement in both servers and clients. All providers’ antivirus servers can be installed on
X86 PC and run in the Microsoft Windows-based platform as showed in Table 4.
Table 4: System requirements for different antivirus software
Symantec Trade Micro McAfee
Hardware
Requirements
64 MB RAM
111 MB of disk space
Intel P200 MHz above
128MB of RAM
300MB of disk space
Intel P200 MHz above
32MB RAM
38MB of disk space
Intel P166 MHz above
Software
Requirements
Win 2000 Pro. or above
Web server: MS IIS Server
Win 2000 Pro. or above
Web server: MS IIS Server
Win 2000 Pro. or above
Web server: MS IIS Server
In order to centralize management all clients, M University installed Symantec server-site on
two X86 PCs to support over 300 clients. V Telecom and F Electric installed the antivirus
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servers on X86 industrial PCs in order to compatibility with existing IT hardware. S Tech
used only secondhand X86 PC to be the server. According to these findings, the antivirus
servers can be installed on the existing hardware platform even businesses switching to new
CAV. It is not necessary to buy additional hardware or system software (operating systems)
when switching to new CAV, showed low asset specificity on CAV. The clients are available
for Windows, Linux, Netware and Novell; various platforms operating on desktops.
Therefore, the effect of assets specificity is not significant in clients too, which leads us to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: The lower asset specificity regarding the CAV, the higher frequency business
switches their CAV without “lock-in”.
Learning Costs
For the necessary of regular up-to-date service, businesses adopting antivirus service are
likely to outsource a software project or service to antivirus providers. It is appropriate to
evaluate the CAV service by software outsourcing criteria. Wang (2002) defined specific
skill learning in software outsourcing as “the unique skills, functions, and business
knowledge required for completing the software outsourcing project”. Thus, this paper
defined skill learning of CAV as the unique skills and antivirus knowledge required for
implementation and maintenance inside the business.
This paper refers the learning costs caused by a CAV switching decision as the degree of
difficulty involved in unique skills and antivirus knowledge required to implementation and
maintenance a new CAV inside the business. We comment the learning cost is high if it takes
the IT staffs a long period of time to acquire the skill. Oppositely, the learning cost is low if
the IT staffs can acquire the skill quickly.
Table 5: The effect of switching costs on cases
Transaction Cost
Bounded
Rationality
Opportunism Uncertainty Asset
specificity
Learning
Cost
Artificial
Cost
M University    - - 
V Telecom -   - - 
F Electric  - - - - -
S Tech  - - - - 
 = Significant, - = Not significant
Table 5 illustrated the results of four cases, whether switching CAV was successful or not,
they all experienced low degree of difficulty involved in learning. Essentially, the CAV is
designed to detect and remove viruses, and thus the user interfaces and required operating
skills are similar to each other. Consequently, the IT staffs do not need long-term training to
maintain new antivirus software. For example, even thought F Electric and S Tech had no
assistance from antivirus resellers, both were able to deploy new CAV quickly. The findings
illustrated difficulty level required in installing and operating various CAV is low. Hence, we
put forward the following proposition regards to the learning costs.
Proposition 3: The lower level of operational skills is experienced by businesses, the higher
frequency switching to a new CAV.
Artificial Costs
Artificial costs are business costs that incurs to retain its exiting customers or to attract new
ones. The costs originate from the sales strategies employed by the existing provider and the
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new provider involved in a firm’s switching processes. To identify such costs, researchers
need to distinguish the sales actions in the switching proceeding of antivirus software.
Consequently, we found that, to reduce/increase artificial costs, providers offer free upgrades,
free trials, price discounts, free training, and free deployment. Table 6 summarized the
findings about the artificial costs in four cases.
Table 6: Artificial Costs
M University F Electric V Telecom S Tech
Existing New Existing New Existing New Existing New
Upgrade Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Free Trials Y N N N N N Y N
Discount Y(more) N Y Y(more) N N Y N
Free training Y Y Y Y N N Y N
Switching decision    
“Y” Did, “N“ Did nothing
The existing antivirus provider of M University, Symantec, offered more benefits than the
alternative provider, Trend Micro. Trend Micro offered only one month trial CAV and a half-
day training session for the IT staffs, the Symantec offered an upgrade of the CAV, which
supported more features for client protection (e.g. an incoming e-mail scanning for virus
detection), and a trial software of e-mail gateway. Furthermore, the Symantec offered
unlimited trial and price discounts as incentives to secure M University’s business. Symantec
offered M University better deal than Trend Micro, M University decided to continue with
the Symantec and signed a two-year contract, which allowed them to upgrade to a new
version of the CAV. In case of V Telecom, a well-known business in Taiwan, its antivirus
policy will be a template for others. The new provider, McAfee, offered CAV with a low
price in order to have a successful case in the Taiwan market as an advertising to attract other
businesses. That is, McAfee hoped for increase in revenue from other businesses. Also, the
existing provider, Symantec, offered V Telecom a big discount too. In addition to McAfee
CAV’s lower price, and it was the only compatible with the new e-mail system; thus, V
Telecom decided to switch to McAfee. In this case we found again, pricing is an important
factor that affects CAV switching decisions; low price implies lower artificial costs.
F Electric had procured new CAV from a long-term supplier when they decided to switch
CAV to the Symantec, and it was deployed by F electric’s IT staffs. The company’s CISO
commented that the major switching costs were generated by man hours of artificial cost to
deploy the new software on all clients inside the business. Another example is the S Tech,
they deployed Symantec CAV to recover form a worm-type virus outbreak, and latter remove
it and reinstalled Trend Micro CAV on all clients due to still one more year contract with
Trend Micro. While the Symantec was going to terminate the contract with S Tech, Symantec
only called about repurchase, but Trend Micro offered more than Symantec, e.g. Price
discount, Trial software, and free antivirus training for IT staffs, to increase S Tech’s
repurchase intention. Likely the CISO of F Electric mentioned above, the S Tech’s CISO
pointed out the major artificial costs was incurred by installation cost; e.g.: installed
Symantec software on all clients and remove Trend Micro, re-installed Trend Micro on all
clients then remove Symantec.
Proposition 4: The more sales strategies are adopted by the provider to reduce the artificial
costs, the higher frequency businesses switching to the provider’s CAV.
Installation cost is a vital element within artificial cost which businesses have to consider in
CAV switching. In spite of switching results, successful or failed, the installation cost were
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occurred in the CAV switching process because the four cases surveyed in this study were
experienced installing antivirus software on all clients. Therefore, we proposed the following
mathematical equation to calculate setup cost within artificial cost when switching CAV: Cr=
Ch*Q*T + where Cr denotes the total installation costs, Ch denotes the cost per man hour, Q
is the number of clients in the business, T is the time spent per client installation, and is a
firm-specific fixed cost in businesses. According to this equation, the installation cost is
directly related to the number of clients within the business; that is, a firm with more clients,
generates more installation costs. Hence, we suggest the following proposition regarding
installation cost within artificial costs.
Proposition 5: The higher installation cost recognizes by the businesses, the lower intention
to switch to a new CAV.
Conclusion
The conceptual model of this paper is based on three types of switching costs. These distinct
types of switching costs will individually or collectively influence in switching CAV.
Learning costs have the least influence on switching decisions, transaction costs and artificial
costs have a significant effect on switching decisions. Furthermore, the combination of these
two costs makes switching decisions even more complicatedness.
Our study contributes to security research in several ways. First, based on the interview
results, we constructed an index map to detail kinds of switching costs, as shown in Tables 7-
1 and 7-2. The index maps can help businesses identify which type of switching costs affect
them most, and can assist them when evaluating various CAV packages. If there are more
“Yes” than “No” answers, it means that the switching costs are lower. Conversely, more
“No” than “Yes” answers implies that the switching costs are higher.
Table7-1: An index map for evaluating CAV switching costs
Type Assessment
Bounded Rationality Yes No
Customers evaluate all CAV packages on the market
Opportunism Yes No
Customers trust provider’s (or certificated reseller’s) reputation.
Customers believe the information that provider (or reseller) provide
Assets specificity Yes No
No need to buy extra hardware when switching to new CAV
Excepting new CAV, no need to buy extra software when switching to
new CAV
No need for long-term training when switching to another CAV
Uncertainty Yes No
Pretest the new antivirus software before switching
Transaction
Costs
Changing the CAV will not affect the company's existing IT structure
Transaction costs Low high
Table7-2: An index map for evaluating CAV switching costs
Type Assessment
Existing provider Yes No
The provider offers discounts in order to sell CAV
The provider offers free training for CAV
Substitute provider Yes No
The provider offers a price discount to attract the potential buyer
The provider offers free training for the new CAV
Artificial
Costs
The provider offers free installation of CAV in all clients (included in the
purchase price)
Artificial costs Low High
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Second, CISO is unable to measure the performance and effectiveness of various CAV
precisely due to the lack of deep domain knowledge and bounded rationality. Because of
these limitations, businesses prefer to adopt CAV from industrial leaders, rather than second-
tier providers. Therefore, providers’ market share and brand reputation are important while
businesses adoption about CAV. Third, the adoption cost plays a vital factor in the decision-
making process of switching CAV. That means when businesses evaluate the CAV among
Symantec, Trend Micro, and McAfee; a provider who offers the lowest price could be the
winner. Thus, our research suggests that second-tier providers use “low-price” as a strategy to
attract customers who normally purchase CAV from industrial leaders. Nevertheless, brand
reputation is still very important for second-tier providers in the antivirus industry, so they
must prove that their software performances are better than the industrial leaders.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, after-sales service is important in the antivirus industry,
providers should be responsible for helping businesses solve virus outbreak. However, it is
evident that businesses need more assistance in the areas of controlling virus outbreak. This
research found that businesses always fight their own ‘virus wars’ without assistance from
their providers. Hence, we suggest that providers should be more proactive in helping their
customers by providing security solutions that meet the customers’ needs. This would
increase a customer’s artificial costs and lock-in the customer further.
Though this study provides a lot of insights to the CAV switching decision, it has several
limitations. The study used the case study methodology and thus was limited by the sample
size of the four companies that we used to collected data from, and hence is limited by the
application of the finding. Studying the information security issue from the managerial
perspective is a new concept. It will be helpful to understand the different aspects of the CAV
switching decision by observing and interviewing more cases.
While this study has its limitation in generalizing the findings across different business
settings, the insights gained in this study can still be of value to some businesses situations.
More knowledge may be added to this subject through accumulating more case examples. In
addition, the decision about switching CAV is not solely based on the switching costs and the
software’s effectiveness. Except these factors, there may be other factors that influence the
corporate antivirus software switching decision, e.g. a business’s political power, and are
worthy of further study.
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